Harry Victor Jaffa, Leo Strauss’s Bulldog

by George Anastaplo*

In 1859 Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species burst like a bombshell on the 19th-century scene. [Thomas Henry] Huxley, despite his youth, was one of three scientists . . . whose blessing Darwin sought before publication. A close attachment developed between the two men, and, while Darwin kept as far possible out of the fray, Huxley became his “bulldog” for the next tumultuous decade, acting as his chief public supporter.

Encyclopedia Britannica1

I.

Harry Jaffa’s ingenuity, passion and persistence when engaged in public controversies are legendary. He may well be the most spirited of the Straussians, at least among those Straussians who are most intelligent and most learned. He does seem to love “a good fight.”

Perhaps the most notorious controversies in which he has been caught up are those with fellow Straussians. This has reinforced a distinction drawn by observers between “Eastern” and “Western” Straussians.2 These contests have been very much concerned with, among other things, how the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Civil War should be understood.3 My own sympathies in these contests have tended to be with Professor Jaffa, whatever reservations I may sometimes have about the way he puts the superior arguments. In such matters, that is, substance must ultimately take precedence over style.

Particularly noteworthy in the Jaffian substance has been the work done by him on Thomas Aquinas, on William Shakespeare, on Abraham Lincoln, on Winston Churchill, and on Leo Strauss.4 This work has been accompanied, for a half-century now, by Harry Jaffa’s generous recognition of the work of others. I, for example, have benefitted from the respect he has shown, in public as well as in private, for my own work.5 That work includes the introduction of Mr. Jaffa to a college audience in 1980, an introduction which elicited from him the response, “I must say that that is the most remarkable introduction I have ever had or that I am ever likely to have.”6

II.

I recognized, in my 1980 introduction of Harry Jaffa, his remarkable accomplishments. I also noticed on that occasion a “few differences between us.”7 My catalogue of differences began in this way:

Mr. Jaffa not only makes far more of exercising than I do . . . but he also is a much more vigorous moralist than I am, both in regulating his own conduct and in judging the conduct of others. I believe that I allow more than he does for good-intentioned errors, for inefficiency on the part of people, and for circumstances which account for, sometimes even justify, what seem from the outside to be moral aberrations. Compassion can be almost as important as moral indignation in these matters, particularly with respect to domestic relations, whether the subject be abortion, divorce or homosexuality. Perhaps also I make more than he does of the importance – if only out of respect for the sensibilities of others and for the moral tone of the community – of discretion, if not even of good-natured hypocrisy.8

I concede, in passing here, that it has long seemed evident to me that most abortions, at least in this country, seem to have been “required” by conduct in which those who thus terminate pregnancies should never have been engaged.9 I will say much more, further on in this Essay, about the homosexuality issue.10 My 1980 catalogue of our differences continues:

[Mr. Jaffa and I] differ as well with respect to the conduct of foreign relations. We do share an abhorrence of tyranny, whether of the Right or of the Left. But we sometimes part company on assessments of how constitutional government and American republicanism can best be defended abroad. Thus, he was much more hopeful than I could ever be that our involvement in the Vietnam War (however noble in intention that involvement might have been, and that it was, in some respects) – he was much more hopeful than I was that our Vietnam involvement could do the American or the Indo-Chinese people some good.11

I suspect that our differences with respect to Vietnam have counterparts in our respective assessments of what the United States has been doing recently both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.12 More foreign policy differences between us may be seen as my 1980 catalogue continues:

Today we differ as to precisely what kind of a threat the Russians pose to us. I see them as much more vulnerable (both politically and militarily) than does he; and I consider all too many calculations about nuclear war “scenarios” to depend too much on game theories and not enough on political judgment. I believe, for example, that the Russian leaders are much more constrained by domestic public opinion (by a pacific, even though patriotic, public opinion) and by other factors than many of us recognize. They have suffered, at home and abroad, a considerable setback in Afghanistan; we can only hope that they, and we, do not suffer an even greater setback by a Russian invasion of Poland. But whatever happens in Poland, it is now evident that the cause of freedom is bound to be in better shape in Eastern Europe than it has been since the Second World War – in part because of what Polish workers have done in showing the world how things really stand there. The only question may be what price the Polish people will have to pay, and this may depend, in part, on their prudence and on ours.13

I then attempted, in this 1980 catalogue of differences, to suggest what may ultimately separate us:

Perhaps at the heart of the differences between Mr. Jaffa and me – whether the differences be as to the status of exercise or as to assessments of the Russians – is with respect to how much one should be concerned with the preservation of one’s life. An immoderate cherishing of what happens to be one’s own can lead, it seems to me, to psychic paralysis or to undue combativeness: either can undermine that relaxed competence which makes healthy statesmanship more likely. Certainly, Mr. Jaffa responds much more than I do to the apocalyptic as against the comic, and somewhat less than I do to “liberty” as against “equality.” Obviously, we touch here on questions about the nature of human existence, of virtue, and of happiness.14

But, of course, this 1980 recapulation of our relations could not be left with an inventory of differences. Thus, I went on to say:

On the other hand, at the heart of our deep affinities–besides the fact that we were both fortunate enough to share a great teacher in Leo Strauss– is our minority belief that fundamental to sensible political science and to a decent life as a community is a general respect for natural right and what is known as natural law. This means, among other things, that discrimination based on arbitrary racial categories cannot be defended, especially by a people dedicated to the self-evident truth that “all Men are created equal.” It also means that the family as an institution should be supported.

…[A]n informed study of nature in human things is perhaps the most pressing demand in education today– and for this Mr. Jaffa, with his profound grasp of the Classical writers, of Shakespeare’s thought, and of the career of Abraham Lincoln, is an invaluable  guide . 15


15. Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, p. 50.  I recently had occasion to supply the following endorsement for Harry Jaffa’s A New Birth of Freedom: “On exhibit in this book is a powerful intellect… Among the prominent Americans who are brilliantly illuminated here as they have rarely been are Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun, Jefferson Davis and, of course, Abraham Lincoln.”

III.

It should be useful, in thinking about Harry Jaffa as a remarkable polemicist, to consider now in some detail the homosexuality-related issues of our day. Obviously, homosexuality is much more in evidence among us today and hence more “accepted” than it was a generation or two ago. Even so, it remains troublesome for those who do have to deal with it. For example, it must be a rare family that is anything but dismayed upon discovering that one of its members is decidedly homosexual, however reassuring the Classical Greek toleration of, if not even intermittent respect for, homosexuality may seem to some.16

My first extended comments in print (that I recall) on the homosexuality question is that found in my 1971 treatise, The Constitutionalist:

Does not liberty depend, to some extent, on intermittent inefficiency, just as community depends on some residual puritanism? It is this puritanism– the caring by the community about certain more or less primitive things even when sophistication would teach it otherwise–upon which the current literary permissiveness is likely to founder…. Indeed, “community” can be understood as that association which “cares” about such things…. Here, too, is the obstacle which the current attempt to legitimate homosexuality will not be able to overcome (except in the hidden recesses of our larger cities)…. Mere sexual gratification is, among us, too much the proclaimed purpose of homosexual relations: that is, such relations do not have that obvious purpose in nature (related to the family) which heterosexual relations have and which the community (even in its most puritanical frenzy) cannot help respecting. The prudent statesman should make the best of the “confrontation” by counseling one side to be discreet, the other side to be compassionate. (The community’s awareness of what is natural– an awareness which can be expected to survive the efforts of modern social science– will also set limits upon “women’s liberation” movements. It is this awareness of nature, of its mysteries and its “intentions,” which is reflected in the solemnity in the autopsy room of normally irreverent medical students, in the effect upon even experienced doctors of an untimely death, and in the sense of purposelessness which is evoked in the adult by the permanently retarded child. The autopsy-room experience [which is accented for survivors by the puzzling trauma of a recent passing from life to death] is further illuminated if we should notice the parts of the body which have, in the course of dissection, a sobering effect even in the typically boisterous anatomy room: the face, the hand, and the genitalia– perhaps because they remind us of what is intimately ours, the distinctively human [that is, of man as both social and rational], and hence, of ourselves. I suspect that the principal reason why dissection of the hand affects the anatomist in this way is that he sees before him a hand being worked upon by a hand, thereby bringing home to him both the humanity of the object being worked upon and the mortality of the workman.)17

A decade later I spoke of a need “to caution against the prejudices and fears that find expression in … the callousness we can exhibit toward the afflicted, the eccentric, and the immature among us, such as homosexuals and the unruly, people who all too often cannot help or enjoy being different or otherwise troublesome.”18

Further on, in my Amendments to the Constitution commentary, I make this suggestion: “Constitutional rights are more apt to be enhanced for homosexuals, as homosexuals, wherever individualism comes to dominate any way of life. The paramount considerations here, however, should be those of justice for and decent treatment of homosexuals, looking more to political than to constitutional redress of grievances.”19

Harry Jaffa’s responses to what he perceives, not without reason, to be the social challenges of homosexuality have been, for decades now, far more vigorous than I believe is called for. Particularly striking among his responses were his remarks to a college student who questioned him about these matters a generation ago:

[W]hy do you suppose it is an outrage to say that homosexuality, like rape and incest, strikes at the integrity of the human family? Do you not think that a real family, a family “according to nature,” has a man and woman, a father and mother, at its core? Do you not see that the integrity of any family depends upon confining sexual friendship to husband and wife, and that whatever dilutes – or pollutes – this friendship, weakens the entire family structure and deprives the family – and thereby free society – of its natural moral authority? The typical justification of homosexuality is that the sexual behavior of consenting adults is not subject to any just criticism from anyone else. But suppose the ones consenting are brother and sister, father and daughter, or mother and son? You will find no argument against incest in the homosexual literature. But why is consent made the authorizing ground of behavior? In the Declaration of Independence, the “just powers of government” are derived from “the consent of the governed.” Not any powers, but only just powers. Consent as such does not authorize anything intrinsically immoral. The community of Jonestown – all 900 souls – committed suicide by unanimous consent. Did that make it right? Particularly since the several hundred children were beneath the age of consent. Much as I appreciate your goodwill, I can see no consistent ground for objecting to the equation of Jefferson and Hitler, for someone who does not see that sodomy is, in the decisive respect, as morally offensive as incest and rape. To abandon the morality that is intrinsic to the family is to abandon the ground for distinguishing a Hitler from a Jefferson.20

Thus, it can seem to the reader that homosexuality is equated here with rape and incest. A few years later homosexuality seemed to be equated by Mr. Jaffa to slavery and genocide as well. This was in the course of his effort to explain why he “regard[s] homosexuality [as] against natural law”:

I challenge anybody who wants to defend homosexuality to say if they condemn slavery and genocide. Assuming they do condemn slavery and genocide (unless they are some kind of a Hitler) I think we would say that all would agree today that slavery and genocide are wrong.

However, as far as I can tell, the only ground on which they can be condemned is on the basis of nature. We do not speak of a rider enslaving a horse, or the farmer enslaving the ox who is pulling the plow. We do not speak of the slaughter of cattle in the Kansas City or Chicago stockyards as genocide. Why? Because these are animals of an inferior species, which we understand can be used for human purposes without violating any moral law.

That does not necessarily mean that people have a right to torture or do bad things ro dogs, or cats, or horses, just because they are inferior. We have an obligation not to inflict unnecessary pain on all living things. However, the order of nature is such that some species, herbivores, only eat grain or herbs. Carnivores eat the herbivores and human beings eat both. This is not contrary to morality and seems to be part of the order of nature.

Thus, the distinction upon which we make these moral judgments is based on distinctions in nature, which we find in and are consistent with nature.

Of all the distinctions in nature from which morality can be inferred, nothing is more profound than the distinction between male and female, which runs not only for human nature but through all nature.

The word nature itself, both in Greek and Latin, refers to living things. The principle of life, in virtue of which a species perpetuates itself, is the distinction between male and female. If we look at this distinction as it occurs in the human species, we can see the principle of self-preservation at work.21

IV.

My own most recent extended discussion of the homosexuality issue may be found in the supplementary Preface I prepared in 2004 for the reprinting (a year later) of my 1971 treatise, The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment.22 This 2004 Preface includes a recognition of the difficulty these days in “anticpat[ing] the likely effects of massive technological innovations, such as the Internet, on the legitimate community efforts to assess and to regulate who is doing what to whom and where.”23 There are here serious and enduring issues bearing on the conditions for and the consequences of that genuine and responsible self-government properly associated with a republican regime.

Following upon this recognition are my suggestions (in my 2004 Constitutionalist Preface) about “the contrived issues to be contended with [by us] from time to time.” Among these issues is “the concern expressed in some quarters these days about the dangerous implications of any official recognition of ‘same-sex marriages,’ depending on what form such recognition takes and on what precisely it is taken to mean.”24 I now draw here upon the discussion that follows in my 2004 Preface for The Constitutionalist, a discussion that had not been developed with Mr. Jaffa in mind.25 I mention this lest it be thought that what I am about to  say here is “personal,” especially since I would expect that Harry Jaffa’s deeply-ingrained sense of humanity (reinforced by his sense of humor) would lead him to deal decently with any homosexuals that he personally encounters in everyday life.

Thus, I continue, in my 2004 Preface, with these observations about the concerns expressed from time to time with respect to “any official recognition of ‘same-sex marriages’”:

It can seem rather odd, at a time when obvious sexual promiscuity is rampant among us heterosexuals and when so many conventional marriages routinely end in divorce, that others among us are to be vigorously resisted in their efforts to acquire for themselves the advantages (as well as the duties and the liabilities?) of “marriage,” however fruitless their relations are likely to be. (All this is aside from what various religious communities, as well as citizens at large, are left free to regard as proper sexual relations and a valid marriage.) The perennial homosexual minority among us would be more discreet (and probably healthier) in its relations than it is now if our heterosexual majority had not become, in recent decades, so blatant and hence so generally corrupting in its eroticism.26

One particularly distressing consequence of this eroticism has been the dramatic proliferation among us of babies born out of wedlock. We heterosexuals, not the homosexual minority among us, are  obviously responsible for this moral and social disaster.27

Among the responses we hear to the provocative indiscretions of ever-more-militant homosexuals are proposals by some conservatives for a constitutional amendment with a view to “saving marriage.” My response, in turn, takes this form in my 2004 Constitutionalist Preface:

As matters now stand, a constitutional amendment here can be expected to have as much (that is, as little) useful effect as a balanced-budget amendment or as an anti-flag-desecration amendment. (Efforts would still have to be made to permit sensible financial and other arrangements for useful domestic partnerships, homosexual or heterosexual.) One can be reminded here of the folly of the Prohibition Amendment, which not only contributed to the development of organized crime in the United States but, even worse, gave governmental promotion of morality a bad name. In these and like matters, both outrage and apathy should be discouraged – and a moderating generosity should be encouraged.28

My discussion of this issue, in my 2004 Preface, assesses the two most conspicuous sets of contenders today, those from whom and about whom we hear most at this time:

[R]eligious fundamentalists and militant homosexuals should at least recognize that they do share these days, despite their sometimes bitter rivalry, a considerable respect for any partnership that can plausibly be called “marriage.” In this they are now apt to appear more “old-fashioned” than most of the rest of the community. In addition, each of these factions may be somewhat suicidal in how it conducts itself with respect to these and like matters. That is, it can be instructive to figure out why the status of nature does seem to be, for each faction, an enduring problem, albeit in significantly different ways, promoting immaturity among some and superstition among others.29

I turn, then, in that Preface to observations about general conditions with respect to the use and abuse of law among us:

Whatever may be attempted, by constitutional amendment or otherwise, to regulate the names applied to the intimate, ostensibly permanent, relations of a somewhat sexual character that people venture to establish among themselves, it is widely accepted that lawlessness is on the rise among us. Such lawlessness seriously limits what the community can reasonably be expected to do in regulating the language and personal conduct of citizens. Symptomatic of this lawlessness is how we have become accustomed to seeing stop-signs and red lights treated by motorists.30

I thereafter illustrate the deterioration in law-abidingness by recording an all-too-familiar  urban phenomenon these days:

My own personal campaign here… is to discourage cyclists from riding on sidewalks when there are pedestrians present. (I speak here as someone who bikes some fifty miles each week, when the weather permits.) Why do some cyclists behave this way? The ones I have stopped explain to me that it is dangerous for them to ride in the street! My rejoinders fall on deaf ears, even when I suggest the shamelessness of their deliberately shifting the risk from themselves to unwary pedestrians. A curious feature of all this is that I am virtually alone in protesting this kind of thoughtless assault upon vulnerable pedestrians.31

This comment on selfishness in our neighborhoods is followed by recollections of selfishness on a much grander scale:

We can see, here as elsewhere, the self-centeredness that we are somehow promoting among ourselves. This kind of attitude is sometimes ratified at the highest levels of our community, as when a leading politician can explain, without any evident regret, that he had had “other priorities” than to serve in his youth in a war that he was willing if not even eager to have others conscripted to fight. Other such illustrations readily come to mind, including that of a man who could parade as a “War President” even though he had, in his youth, evidently used family influence to avoid the risk of military combat. He proved a fitting successor to another President who refused to resign after having been exposed as a reckless deceiver of a trusting public, once again placing thereby his personal interests above those of both his country and his party.32

Such recollections should challenge, among others, those would-be conservatives who make much these days of patriotism and manliness.

I can then add, as a caution for both militants and fundamentalists who insist on their respective prerogatives without compromise, this suggestion:

Vital to any serious consideration both of what constitutionalism means and of when and how our rights should be insisted upon is the problem of prudence, something I have made more and more of over the years. That is, it is not simply enough to be entitled to rights. It is vital that citizens should be influenced, by an informed public opinion if not directly by government, in how they claim and use those rights.33

Indeed, it can be said, considerations with respect to prudence divide Mr. Jaffa and me even as to the comparative ranking of the Constitution and Abraham Lincoln. I believe that Lincoln himself would recognize his ultimate subordination to the Constitution.34 I also believe that he would refer the more extreme partisans on both sides in the homosexuality engagement to Harry Jaffa’s illuminating discussion of the Temperance Speech.35

V.

The discussion of the homosexuality issue in my 2004 Constitutionalist Preface was anticipated by a letter I published a decade earlier in the Windy City Times, a weekly newspaper serving the homosexual community in Chicago. That letter opens:

Jon-Henri Damski, in his [Windy City Times] column of December 8, [1994] reports on his recent visit with my Jurisprudence seminar at the Loyola School of Law. He was one of a series of visitors invited by me to present unorthodox approaches to issues of the day for law students to consider as part of a semester-long inquiry into the nature of evidence, moral principles, and social theories. Our visitors displayed unconventional approaches to divine revelation, faith healing, psychic phenomena, creation science, and UFOs.

Mr. Damski was invited as a recognized advocate of homosexual interests in the community. He proved to be as instructive for our seminar as I had hoped he would be. Although he questions in his column my classroom use of the term homosexual, I still do not know of any other generally accepted non-derogatory term which encompasses both male and female members of the community that Mr. Damski so ably champions.36

This Windy City Times letter, of December 1994, continues with these observations by me about the matters we discussed in my Jurisprudence seminar:

Mr. Damski suggests that my approach to these matters is outdated. He says in his column. “While reading his book Human Being and Citizen, I realized that Anastaplo’s writings about our community is confined to subjects such as the Wolfenden Report in England over 30 years ago.” Unfortunately, Mr. Damski evidently has not noticed that the book of mine that he thus draws upon was published twenty years ago and that the essay therein which does discuss the Wolfenden Report was originally published in 1967.

I have had more up-to-date things to say in print about homosexuality in the United States, including in the following recently published review of differences since the Second World War between myself as a “liberal” and many “conservatives”: “These differences extend, for example, to how affirmative action should be used by us (the issue here, it still seems to me, is prudential, not constitutional) and to how homosexuality should be both talked about and treated in this country. I believe it both fair and humane to insist that the typical homosexual in this country today, just like the typical American Communist Party member since the First World War, probably wants truly good things for himself, for his friends and family, and for his country.”

I endorse, therefore, Mr. Damski’s point when he says in his December 8th column, “That is all gays and lesbians are asking in our contemporary society: No special rights, just treat us as equal citizens until you get to know us. Be hospitable. Obey the laws of God.”37

There can be, of course, serious differences of opinion as to what “the laws of God” do call for. This is reflected in what I say further on in my December 1994 Windy City Times letter:

I do not believe there is any reliable authority for what is said by Mr. Damski to the effect that what was condemned in Genesis (chapter 10) was a breach of hospitality and not at all sodomy when Lot was confronted by the demands of the men of Sodom for Lot’s visitors. I believe, that is, that Mr. Damski is simply mistaken about what the Bible says here and elsewhere against male homosexuality. What we in turn should say about and do with the vigorous Biblical condemnation of homosexuality in our changed circumstances is quite another matter, circumstances which include what now seems to be known about the genetic bases for some homosexuality.38

I mention, if only in passing, that it does not seem to me to be useful today to make as much as some do of the term sodomy in condemning homosexuality. For one thing, it does not seem to be generally appreciated that a great many respectable heterosexuals have always routinely engaged in acts which have traditionally been regarded by many State laws as sodomy.39 This is not unrelated to such problems as that of determining which of the many forms among us of flag-desecration should be regarded as criminal.40

VI.

It should be recognized that the more vigorous partisans of the causes that engage us do not always speak with an appropriate restraint.41 Homosexuals, for example, probably should make much more of “domestic partnerships” than of “marriage” (just as the most dedicated advocates of racial desegregation recognize that there are still communities in which one cannot safely “advertise” one’s interracial sexual relations).42

On the other hand, the fundamentalists who condemn adoptions by homosexual couples should recognize that most of the tens of thousands of children thus provided for in this country and elsewhere are likely to be far better off than they would have been where and how they were. It should also be recognized that there are all around us homosexuals who are decent people contributing reliably to the communities in which they are able to live and flourish.43

The underlying problem here is not with whatever defects homosexuals may naturally have to cope with from time to time. Rather, it is with the eroticism obscenely promoted and widely enjoyed by heterosexuals–that pervasive eroticism which is corrupting the community at large. Homosexuals, in this respect, are becoming distressingly like their heterosexuals brothers and sisters.44 And, of course, those male homosexuals who are most promiscuous can, because of the somewhat suicidal AIDS epidemic, seem unnaturally self-destructive. The considerable self-destructiveness of promiscuous heterosexuals (female as well as male) is less obvious, but yet probably far more influential and harmful for some time now in the country at large.45

VII.

I return, in preparing to close, to my opening remarks about Leo Strauss in this essay.  I do not believe that it is in the spirit of Mr. Strauss to talk publicly as some of the partisans even of moral virtue sometimes talk these days.46 The misuse of our teacher may be seen in how he has been identified with the dubious “neo-conservative” foreign policies of our day.47

Such identification can properly be challenged by those who knew this wise man best, as I indicate in my Letter to the Editor of June 9, 2003:

Leo Strauss’s daughter has reported that she does not recognize her father in the recent news stories about him as the mastermind behind the neo-conservative ideologues who are said to control American foreign policy today. (See her New York Times article of June 7, 2003, p. A29.) Some of us who were Mr. Strauss’s students at the University of Chicago also fail to see him as the reactionary guru that some would evidently like him to be.

I recall, for example, what he said to me after I lost my Illinois Bar Admission “loyalty-oath” case in the United States Supreme Court. (366 U.S. 82 [1961]) That is, his two-sentence letter to me of June 22, 1961, was hardly that of a right-wing ideologue: “This is only to pay you my respects for your brave and just action. If the American Bench and Bar have any sense of shame they must come on their knees to apologize to you.”

I suspect that Leo Strauss, upon confronting those Administration adventurists who now claim to find in his teachings support for their presumptuous imperialism, would recall (as he often did) the Dutch grandmother’s advice: “You will be surprised, my son, to learn with how little wisdom this world of ours is governed.”48

The wisdom routinely exhibited by Leo Strauss would include a charitable recognition that those women and men fated, perhaps by nature, to be fully trapped in their homosexuality are not likely to become grandmothers and grandfathers in the deepest, most socially useful, and hence most satisfying sense of these terms.49

Notes

* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago; Lecturer in the Liberal Arts, The University of Chicago; and Professor Emeritus of Political Science and of Philosophy, Dominican University.  This essay was originally commissioned for a book that never materialized.


1. See, also, the T.H. Huxley entry in the Dictionary of National Biography. Harry V. Jaffa has the charming characteristic of sometimes being considerably more prudent in private than in public. The only other men of note in whom I have personally observed this trait have been Paul H. Douglas and Milton S. Mayer.

Also charming is Harry Jaffa’s old-fashioned (even Tom Sawyerish) openness to hero-worship. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book One, Chapter 4 (on the great-souled man). His heroes have included Winston S. Churchill, Calvin Coolidge, Abraham Lincoln, Moses, William A. Pedersen, Ronald W. Reagan and, of course, Leo Strauss. Consider, as well, his generous Letter to the Editor, “‘Terminator’ IRS Hounds Joe Louis Into Poverty,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2002, p. A11. See, on not being “complicit in injustice,” Note 49, below.

2. See, e.g., Scot J. Zentner, “The Philosopher and the City: Harry Jaffa and the Straussians,”

Interpretation, vol. 30, p. 273 (2003). See, also, Note 47, below.

3. See, e.g., Harry V. Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1984), pp. 121f, 143f, 148f, 157f. See, also, Jaffa, “Crisis of the Strauss Divided,” Social Research, vol. 54, p. 579 (1987).

4. See the three dozen Harry V. Jaffa entries in John A. Murley, ed., Leo Strauss, A Bibliographic Legacy (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2005). One of his most thoughtful essays is the discussion of the character of Winston Churchill in Harry V. Jaffa, ed., Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Winston S. Churchill (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), pp. 25-39.

5. Consider, for example, the Jaffa endorsement provided for the jacket of my book, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Biography (preferred title, Thoughts on Abraham Lincoln: A Discourse on Prudence) (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999): “The finest scholarly writing on Lincoln’s words that I know. My feeling is that Anastaplo must have sat at Lincoln’s elbow as he composed the Proclamation of September 1862, and discussed it with him, paragraph by paragraph. As a proof of the possibility that one can understand a great writer as he understood himself, it is the definitive refutation of historicism.” Mr. Jaffa observed about my book, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), that this was the first time anyone had tried to read the Constitution like a book. He also said that this Commentary “is less a commentary – in the ordinary sense – than it is a communion with the text. In that respect, it reminds one of nothing so much as Leo Strauss’s parallel study of Plato’s Laws.” Ibid., p. xvii. See, on the Plato’s Laws, Note 46, below. It has also been noticed that “Harry Jaffa builds on George Anastaplo’s observation that the references to God in the Declaration of Independence portray Him in terms of the three powers of constitutional government.” George Anastaplo, “Seven Questions for Professor Jaffa,” in Harry V. Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution (Washington, D. C.: Regnery Gateway, 1994), p. 178 (quoting Laurence Berns). See, on the Declaration of Independence and the Divine, Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 25f. (My 1999 Lincoln volume should be supplemented by another volume, Further Thoughts on Abraham Lincoln: A Discourse on Chance and the Good, which would include, among other things, the materials in my article, “Abraham Lincoln and the American Regime,” 35 Valparaiso University Law Review 39-196 (2000), and in my article, “Abraham Lincoln, Lawyers, and the Civil War: Bicentennial Explorations,” 35 Oklahoma City University Law Review 1-114 (2010) (various other of my Lincoln discussions already in print are cited in this 2010 article).

6. Jaffa, American Conservativism and the American Founding, p. 51.

7. Ibid., p. 49. My introduction is included in “A Conversation with Harry V. Jaffa at Rosary College,” ibid., pp. 48-51. See, also, George Anastaplo, The Artist as Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983), pp. 476-79; Anastaplo, “Seven Questions for Professor Jaffa,” in Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution, pp. 168-170. See, as well, Note 47, below.

8. Anastaplo, Introduction of Harry V. Jaffa, in Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, p. 49.

9. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, The American Moralist: On Law, Ethics, and Government (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1992), pp. 389-406. See, also, ibid., p. 603 (“abortion”). See, as well, Anastaplo, The Christian Heritage: Problems and Prospects (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 209-215, 224-35.

10. The divorce issue was, because of unexpected “local” developments, far more critical in our differences a quarter-century ago than it is now.

11. Anastaplo, Introduction of Harry V. Jaffa, in Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, p. 49. See, on the Vietnam War, George Anastaplo, Human Being and Citizen: Essays on Virtue, Freedom, and the Common Good (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1975), pp. 151, 331; Anastaplo, The American Moralist, pp. 225, 245, 623. The Human Being and Citizen volume includes my review of Mr. Jaffa’s 1965 book, Equality and Liberty. See for my review of his 1978 book, How to Think About the American Revolution, Modern Age, vol. 23, p. 314 (1979).

12. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, “September Eleventh: The ABCs of a Citizen’s Responses,” 29 Oklahoma City University Law Review 165, 333-41 (2004). This collection of running commentaries has been supplemented by a collection in the International Law Review (Loyola University of Chicago, 2007) and by a forthcoming collection in the Oklahoma City University Law Review.

13. Anastaplo, Introduction of Harry V. Jaffa, in Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, pp. 49-50.

14. Ibid., p. 50. See, for an undue emphasis on self-preservation (“the ultimate value of any society”), Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951). This is insisted upon in a judicial opinion in which it is assumed that “all concepts are relative.” Ibid., p. 508. Compare Don Erler, “Everybody Believes in Something,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, November 30, 2004, p. 11B. Compare, also, the text at Note 45 of this Essay. The difference between Mr. Jaffa and me with respect to “questions about the nature . . . of virtue” may be reflected in the fact that he thinks more highly than I do of the Duke in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. See Henry V. Jaffa, “Chastity as a Political Principle: An Interpretation of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure,” in John Alvis and Thomas G. West, eds., Shakespeare as Political Thinker (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), p. 181.  See, also, for perhaps related differences (with respect to Shakespeare’s King Lear), Anastaplo, The Artist as Thinker, pp. 25-26. See, further, on Measure for Measure, Anastaplo, “Justice, the Liberal Arts, and Some Basic Training for Lawyers,” 36 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 329, 339-47 (2005).

15. Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, p. 50.  I recently had occasion to supply the following endorsement for Harry Jaffa’s A New Birth of Freedom: “On exhibit in this book is a powerful intellect… Among the prominent Americans who are brilliantly illuminated here as they have rarely been are Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun, Jefferson Davis and, of course, Abraham Lincoln.”

16. Particularly challenging here is what is suggested in some Classical texts about the relation between philosophic impulses and homoeroticism. See, for example, the discussion of Sappho in George Anastaplo, The Thinker as Artist: From Homer to Plato & Aristotle (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997), p. 45. See, also, Notes 29 and 49, below. There should be recalled as well not only the much-depicted relation between Zeus and Ganymede but also the patriotic manliness of the Theban “Sacred Band.” Consider, moreover, Plato, Republic 380D sq., 468B-D. Consider, further, K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1989), pp. 11-13, 153f. Even so, it should not be forgotten that homosexuality finds it difficult to look beyond pleasure as the proper end of eros. “Heterosexuals have always had to anticipate and provide for at least the biological consequences of their liaisons, being reminded thereby of the demands and directives of nature.” Anastaplo, The Thinker as Artist, p. 181.

17. George Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1971), pp. 624-25. See, on the 2005 reprinting of this treatise, Note 22, below. This treatise has been supplemented by two Johns Hopkins University Press Commentaries (Note 5, above, Note 19, below), which have been supplemented in turn by my Reflections on Constitutional Law (published in 2006 by the University Press of Kentucky), by my Reflections of Freedom of Speech and the First Amendment (published in 2007 by the Univeristy Press of Kentucky), and by my Reflections on Life, Death, and the Constitution (published in 2009 by the University Press of Kentucky).

18. Anastaplo, The American Moralist, p. 322 (a 1981 talk). See Note 29, below.

19. George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 447.

20. Harry V. Jaffa, “Homosexuality and the Natural Law,” Claremont Institute, 1990, pp. 14-15. I would, by the way, be surprised to learn that there is “no argument against incest in the homosexual literature.” See Note 25, below. See, on these matters the exchange between Harry V. Jaffa and Philip A. Dynia, 8 Constitutional Commentary 313 (1991), 10 Constitutional Commentary 1, 6 (1993). See, on Jonestown-type “suicides,” Anastaplo, “September Eleventh,” p. 315 (Letter C-1).  See, on babies born to unmarried women, the text at note 27 of this essay.

21. “Morality Is Absolute: The Equal Protection Clause Has Nothing To Do With Same-Sex Marriage, An Interview with Dr. Harry Jaffa,” The American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (2004). Also unduly vigorous is the Jaffa response to my belief that it is “both fair and humane to insist that the typical homosexual in this country today, just like the typical American Communist Party member since the First World War, probably wants truly good things for himself, for his friends and family, and for his country.” See Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution, pp. 367, 380-83. See, also, the text at Note 37 of this Essay. See, as well, Note 43, below. My concluding remarks in that exchange were, “However serious the political differences I have had with Professor Jaffa may have been on occasion, they have been almost inconsequential when compared to the standards and aspirations we have shared, beginning of course with what we learned in our youth from Leo Strauss, as well as from the Bible, Aristotle, Plato, Shakespeare, and Lincoln. Among the other things Harry Jaffa and I somehow share are, first, my grateful recognition that I have yet a lot to learn from him and, second, his generous recognition that there is a lot he still needs to teach me.” Anastaplo, “Professor Jaffa and That Old-Time Religion,” in ibid., p. 368. See, on Leo Strauss and the perils of indignation, ibid., p. 366. See, also, the text at Note 48 of this Essay. See, as well, Note 47, below.

22. This 2005 reprinting of The Constitutionalist was by Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland.

23. Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist (2005 reprinting), p. xxxix. The “doing” referred to here includes “saying.” See Note 45, below.

24. Ibid. (2005 reprinting), p. xxix.

25. Much depends, for how homosexuals conduct themselves and how they are treated, upon where they chance to be and when. (Homosexuals are, after all, fewer than five percent of our total population.) See note 49, below. At the heart of such problems today, I have suggested, may be the debasement of our communal self-respect (or civic-mindedness). Consider, for example, my Letter to the Editor (of February 8, 2005):

We were, during the most recent Presidential State of the Union Address, exposed to still more instances of the current practice of providing “cameo appearances” of noteworthy persons in the Visitors’ Gallery in the House of Representatives. This is done in order to add “human interest” touches to a President’s remarks.

Particularly troubling on this occasion was the use of the obviously distressed “mom and dad” of a Marine who had been killed in Iraq. Show business preempts both statesmanship and genuine compassion in these displays. Is there not something shameless about such deliberate exploitations?

Perhaps most troubling of all is the fact that this sort of display is used, again and again, without noticeable public protest. Our callousness here reveals the deterioration among us of that sturdy moral character upon which an enduring republicanism very much depends.

See Note 32, below.  Related to all this is my Letter to the Editor of January 24, 2007:

Our President singled out, in the Visitors’ Gallery during his most recent State of the       Union Address, a professional basketball star who had come to the United States from    Africa to study medicine but who had been persuaded to play basketball instead.  This is             the wrong message at this time, considering how difficult it can be to persuade all too          many African-American boys that a productive future lies for them in their studies, not in     professional sports.  The advisors to our “Education President” should know better.

At the heart of “the homosexual problem” today (which may really be “a heterosexual  problem” as well) is the recognition that we have “all” known fine people who happen to be homosexuals. See Note 21, above.  I confess to having, personally, more sympathy for lesbians than for their male counterparts, if only because I do share the evident lesbian opinion about the special attractiveness of the females of the human species.

People of the same gender will live together. Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson come to mind as do members of convents, monasteries, and the military. Should not people be able to make enforceable social and economic arrangements by contract, without the State having to determine and evaluate their sexual relations? Obviously, people of opposite genders do frequently live together advantageously without sexual relations. See the text at Note 42 of this Essay.

26. Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist (2005 reprinting), p. xxix.  Mr. Jaffa has long been properly insistent upon the need of healthy family life for a sound political order. Such a concern may be seen as well in the dedications to several of my books:

To My Children and to my Children’s Children with the reminder that their revolutionary Forefathers not only made the American, Greek, and Texas Wars of Independence but thereafter instituted and maintained new Governments of their own.   The Constitutionalist (1971).

To My Parents who discovered as Immigrants from Greece how difficult it is for one to become a Human Being where one is not born a Citizen.  Human Being and Citizen (1975).

To my Wife, Artist and Mother of Artists . . .  The Artist as Thinker (1983).

To My Brothers who, not without considerable personal sacrifice, have for decades honored that ancient republican faith which is grounded in the integrity of the family.  The Constitution of 1787 (1989).

To My Children’s Children and to their Children with the reminder that their patriotic forebears were among the brave Men North and South who both counseled against and fought in the American Civil War.  Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Biography (1999).

27.  “Almost a third of all American births today are to single women.” Editorial, Chicago Tribune, March 26, 2005, sec. 1, p. 18. See, on proper sexual relations, on birth control, and on the dictates of nature in our circumstances, Anastaplo, Human Being and Citizen, pp. 46-60.

28. Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist (2005 reprinting), p. xxix.

29. Ibid., pp. xxix-x1. See, on religious fundamentalists a generation ago (“The Moral Majority, The New Abolitionists?”), Anastaplo, The American Moralist, p. 327. See, on militant homosexuals a generation ago, Anastaplo, The Thinker as Artists, p. 65: “[Sappho seems] sounder than some of her disciples today who tend to be unfairly condemned (by genetic quirks or by chance influences, if not by sterile arguments) to what seems to many an unnatural childhood all their lives.” See, also, Note 16, above. See, as well, the text at Note 18 of this Essay.

30. Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist (2005 reprinting), p. x1.

31. Ibid., p. x1.

32. Ibid., pp. x1-x1i. See, also, Anastaplo, “September Eleventh,” pp. 316-17 (Letter C-4), 337 (Letter C-47). See, as well, Note 25, above.

33. Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist (2005 reprinting), p. xli.

34.  See Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln, pp. 344-49, n. 492.

35. Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided, An Interpretation of the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1959), p. 236.

36. Windy City Times (Chicago, Illinois), December 29, 1994, p. 12.

37. Ibid., p. 12. The understandable desire of homosexuals to be treated as “equal citizens” and as otherwise respectable can contribute to sometimes desperate efforts on their part to “enlist” noted Americans in their cause. See, e.g., C.A. Tripp, The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Free Press, 2005); New York Times Book Review, January 9, 2005, p. 13; Dinitia Smith, “Finding Homosexual Threads in Lincoln’s Legend,” New York Times, December 16, 2004. See, on the Communist Party comparison, Note 21, above.

38. Windy City Times, December 29, 1994, p. 12. See, on the Bible, George Anastaplo. The Bible:  Respectful Readings (Lanham, Maryland:  Lexington Books, 2008).

39. See, on what “the greater number of [American] jurisdictions hold,” Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1951), p. 1563 (“Sodomy” entry). See, also, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563-66, 569-71, 580-85, 599-600 (2003).

40. My Windy City Times letter may also be found in my article, “Lessons for the Student of Law,” 17 Oklahoma City University Law Review 17, 88-89 (1995), and in my article, “‘Racism,’ Political Correctness, and Constitutional Law,” 42 South Dakota Law Review 108, 155-57 (1997). See, for my discouragement of a flag-desecration constitutional amendment, Congressional Record, October 18, 1995, pp. E1965-E1967; Congressional Record, November 3, 1995, p. 16676; Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, April 22, 1995, p. 26.

41. One can be properly troubled by the kind of “outing” seen in Saul Bellow’s Ravelstein. (New York: Viking, 2000). Compare, in Murley, ed., Leo Strauss, A Bibliographic Legacy, my Index Items 211, 217, 226, 994, 1019, 1048, 1121, 1163, 1193; Note 47, below. Compare, also, Sam Portaro, “None So Blind: The Wilde/Douglas Affair,” Criterion (The University of Chicago Divinity School), Winter 2002. Compare, as well, Martin E. Marty and Jerald C. Brauer. eds., The Unrelieved Paradox (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 95-103, 230. See, on the Ravelstein book, Anastaplo, The Christian Heritage, 239-46.

42. See Note 25, above. See, on how one can be curiously misunderstood with respect to race relations, Anastaplo, “‘Racism,’ Political Correctness, and Constitutional Law.” See, also, my articles on this matter in subsequent volumes of the South Dakota Law Review. See, as well, Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist (2005 reprinting), pp. xxviii-xxix. But then, it has been noticed, “If you’ve never been criticized you’ve never been an umpire.” William Zinsser, Spring Training (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), p. 168.

43. See, e.g., Sam Portaro, “Homosexuality as Vocation,” The Witness, June 1991, p. 18. “The mystery and power of sexuality are brutalized in attempts to reduce all behavior to a single norm. To see how love between two persons manifests itself and gives itself back to the community is to witness mystery. . . . Many homosexual Christians, like their heterosexual counterparts, desire only to share their commitment with a larger community.” Ibid., p. 19. “Christian homosexuals might then be encouraged to take their place in the church and to offer with perseverance the gift of their love, and their covenant relationships. The church might be encouraged to receive with gratitude that gift, remembering that we are commanded to be thankful for all things, even those gifts we do not understand or do not receive to our perceived comfort or benefit. The resulting dialogue can be our shared offering, humbly surrendered to the judgement of God.” Ibid., p. 25. This author was at the time the Chaplain at the Episcopal Center at the University of Chicago. He has reminded us, “One can be so open-minded that one’s brain falls out.” Marty and Brauer, eds., The Unrelieved Paradox, p. 98. (The somewhat misleading title for the Portaro article in The Witness was supplied by an editor.) See Note 41, above, Note 49, below. See, also, Note 21, above.

See, as well, Benedict Carey, “Experts Dispute [President] Bush on Gay-Adoption Issue,” New York Times, January 29, 2005, p. A12. I suspect that many homosexual couples with adopted children can provide, to us heterosexuals, models for proper treatment of the children entrusted to our care.

44. Although some homosexuals may seem to “act out” more, the general tone in this country with respect to sexual “values” and related matters are apt to be set by the dominant heterosexuals among us. Consider, for example, the unseemly full-page ads and television commercials for Viagra and its competitors.  Are they not comparable to the advertising for lotteries and casinos?  See, also, George Anastaplo, “What Should We Be Afraid Of?” Greek Star, Chicago, Illinois, May 27, 2010, p. 7; http://www.anastaplo.wordpress.com.

45. See, on self-preservation, Note 14, above. See, on the problem of obscenity among us, Anastaplo, The Constitutionalist, p. 818; Anastaplo, Human Being and Citizen, pp. 117f; Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution, pp. 55f. See, also, the text at Note 23 of this Essay. See, on the challenge of homosexual marriages among us, Mark E. Woicik, “The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years From Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?” 24 Northern Illinois University Law Review 589 (2004).

46. See, for my discussions of Mr. Strauss, George Anastaplo, The Artist as Thinker, pp. 249-72; “Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago,” in Kenneth J. Deutsch and John A. Murley, eds., Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 3-30. See, also, Murley, ed., Leo Strauss, A Bibliographic Legacy, my Index Items 66. 134, 233, 306, 347, 524, 565, 659, 679, 733, 862, 863, 885, 1050, 1071; www.anastaplo.wordpress.com.   See, as well, George Anastaplo, “Constitutionalism and the Good,” 70 Tennessee Law Review 737, 843-51 (2003) (on Leo Strauss’s Philosophy and Law); Anastaplo, But Not Philosophy: Seven Introductions to Non-Western Thought (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), Dedication. The Strauss influence may also be seen in the translation of and commentary on Plato’s Meno prepared by Laurence Berns and me (Newburyport, Massachusetts: Focus Publishing Company, 2004). See Book Review, Review of Metaphysics, vol. 58, p. 871 (June 2005).

Perhaps the most challenging observation by Harry Jaffa about Leo Strauss, particularly as it bears on the inevitable “stand-off” between Revelation and Reason, is this: “When Strauss speaks of revelation, he is not speaking of the poetic imagination; he is speaking of faith founded in the Bible.” Jaffa, “Crisis of the Strauss Divided,” p. 587. See Anastaplo, But Not Philosophy, p. 373. Consider, also, this related observation: “The American tradition of popular government in the person of Lincoln [can be] seen to depend upon the statesman as prophet. And prophecy, as I learned from [Leo] Strauss–and ultimately from Plato’s Athenian Stranger [in the Laws]–was the political name for political science.” Jaffa, American Conservatism and the American Founding, p. 136. (See, on the Laws, Note 5, above.) Consider, as well, the text at Note 34 of this Essay.

47. Conscientious but curiously misguided books by two attractive women, Professor Shadia B. Drury and Professor Anne Norton, come to mind. See Shadia B. Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988); Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). Compare, e.g., George Anastaplo, “Shadia Drury on ‘Leo Strauss,’” The Vital Nexus (Institute of Human Values, Halifax, Nova Scotia), vol. 1, p. 9 (May 1990). On the other hand, I did record, in 1994, some of my own reservations about my fellow Straussians:

My most extensive comment on Mr. Strauss thus far has been in the 1974 eulogy of him reprinted in my book, The Artist as Thinker. It can be instructive to figure out why both that generally well-received eulogy and my useful 1988 review of Allan Bloom’s wrongheaded Closing book have been cold-shouldered by an influential minority of highly partisan Straussians. Their perverse compliment has deprived me and others, and perhaps also themselves, of what might have been salutary corrections: it can be sobering, especially for the self-indulgent, to try to defend in public their private recriminations. But, then, Mr. Jaffa himself (who is [unlike me] at least as “conservative” as his bitterest critics) has never been given by them the full measure of recognition that is his due as perhaps the best-informed student today of the American political heritage. In short, the occasional displays of an unfortunate clannishness by some of my gifted schoolmates can help one begin to see “what intelligent scholars of good faith do manage to find objectionable in the Straussian persuasion.”

Anastaplo, “Professor Jaffa and That Old-Time Religion,” in Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution, p. 363. See the text at Note 2 of this Essay. See, for the Allan Bloom review referred to, Robert L. Stone, ed., Essays on “The Closing of the American Mind” (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 1989), pp. 267-84. See, also, ibid., pp. 225-34. See, as well, Note 41, above. In any event, one should take care, as Nietzsche counseled, not “to philosophize with a hammer.”

48. See Anastaplo, “September Eleventh,” p. 338. See, also, John A. Murley, “In re George Anastaplo,” in Deutsch and Murley, eds., Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime, pp. 159-91. See, as well, Note 21, above.

49. See, for an instructive discussion of some of the matters I touch upon in this Essay, an article by a Professor of Constitutional Law and Politics, at Syracuse University, who regards homosexuality as a “misfortune.” His observations include the following: “It is not completely unreasonable to regard heterosexuality as preferable to homosexuality. There may even be a ‘wavering child’ to whom this information is important. [N. 122] Nevertheless, is discrimination against homosexuals a decent or effective way of expressing this conviction? Are there not other ways less complicit in injustice?” Stephen Macedo, “Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind,” 84 Georgetown Law Journal 261, 292 (1995). Professor Macedo’s Note 122 reads, “Because some will misunderstand this point, and because some gays and lesbians are likely to take (unjustified, I believe) offense on this score, I should emphasize that to the extent that there is misfortune here, it is a misfortune that I share.” (I chanced upon this quite useful Macedo article after I had prepared the text for this Essay. Also useful are Andrew Sullivan’s Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996] and Diana Schaub’s respectful critique of that book in Public Interest, vol. 122, p. 93 [1996]. ) Compare Note 43, above. See, also, Note 25, above. See, as well, Note 1, above.

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